Arizona, State of v. Michael D Lansky LLC
LODGED Proposed re: [240] MOTION for Leave to File… — Attachment 241
Issue: In *Arizona v. Michael D. Lansky LLC*, defendants Avid Telecom, Michael D. Lansky, and Stacey Reeves argue that a VoIP transmission intermediary qualifies as an interactive computer service provider under 47 U.S.C. § 230, immunizing it from TCPA liability for robocall content originated by third-party customers. The motion also presses whether post-*Loper Bright* courts must independently interpret TCPA consent and identification rules free from FCC deference, whether Reeves's role as an alleged independent contractor defeats personal liability, and whether six state TCPA-analog statutes are preempted by federal law — each question arising against a factual record in which defendants concede some operational control over Reeves's assignments.
At the post-discovery, pre-trial stage of this multistate robocall enforcement action, defendants filed a proposed consolidated motion for summary judgment, lodged pending court approval of a separate motion for leave to exceed page limits. The motion advances five distinct legal arguments: that Avid Telecom's status as an information services provider — a characterization defendants contend plaintiffs themselves adopted in earlier pleadings — triggers § 230 immunity under the Ninth Circuit's *Barnes v. Yahoo!* three-part framework; that plaintiffs are judicially estopped from retreating from that characterization under *American Title Insurance Co. v. Lacelaw Corp.*; that FCC TCPA interpretive rules, including written-consent requirements, are no longer binding on courts following *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo* and *McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates*; that a Darden eleven-factor analysis establishes Reeves as an independent contractor with no cognizable TCPA exposure; and that the six state statutes at issue are preempted because plaintiffs cannot demonstrate each imposes restrictions meaningfully more stringent than federal law. Defendants seek summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims.
The § 230 immunity argument is the most doctrinally ambitious element of this filing: no circuit court has applied § 230 to robocall transmission infrastructure, and if a district court accepts the theory, it would extend internet content-moderation immunity well beyond its established domain and likely invite legislative or regulatory response. The *Loper Bright*-to-TCPA pipeline argument is worth watching independently — if courts in the Ninth Circuit adopt the position that FCC consent and caller-identification rules lack binding force, TCPA enforcement could fragment along circuit lines, creating a patchwork of judicially reinterpreted obligations for carriers, enforcement agencies, and plaintiffs alike. The personal liability question for Reeves, if resolved at the circuit level, would also provide useful guidance on the conditions under which corporate officers and contractors in telemarketing operations bear individual TCPA exposure.