Browse Cases
216 resultsBennett v. Google, LLC
Issue: Whether § 230 bars a defamation claim against Google for autocomplete search suggestions that displayed allegedly defamatory phrases when users began typing the plaintiff's name.
Why It Matters: Applied § 230 to search engine autocomplete, holding that algorithmically aggregated suggestions based on third-party search patterns are publisher activity, not independent content creation. Consistent with Force v. Facebook in the Second Circuit on the treatment of algorithmic functions as publisher activity.
View on CourtListener →Pennie v. Twitter, Inc.
Issue: Whether Twitter, Facebook, and Google were liable under the Anti-Terrorism Act for knowingly providing material support to ISIS by allowing the organization to use their platforms to spread propaganda, recruit members, and raise funds.
Why It Matters: An early application of § 230 to anti-terrorism material support litigation, foreshadowing the broader circuit-level debate that culminated in Gonzalez v. Google and Twitter v. Taamneh at the Supreme Court. The district court held that however the claims were framed, the underlying theory required treating the platforms as responsible for user-generated content and account activity — conduct immunized by § 230(c)(1).
View on CourtListener →Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc.
Issue: Whether § 230 bars a California negligence failure-to-warn claim against a platform that had actual independent knowledge of an ongoing offline predatory scheme targeting its users, where the plaintiff's claim did not seek to hold the platform liable as the publisher of any user-generated content.
Why It Matters: The most significant post-Zeran departure from a maximalist reading of § 230 at the circuit level. Doe v. Internet Brands established that § 230(c)(1) is limited to claims that would hold a platform liable as a publisher or speaker of third-party content — it does not reach claims grounded in the platform's own first-party conduct or independent knowledge. The case created a doctrinal fault line: the Second Circuit in Herrick v. Grindr declined to apply the reasoning where the platform's failure to act was itself treated as a failure to remove content.
View on CourtListener →Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.
Issue: Whether § 230(c)(1) bars a Title II Civil Rights Act claim against Facebook for blocking access to a Sikh advocacy group's Facebook page in India, allegedly at the request of the Indian government.
Why It Matters: Applied § 230(c)(1) to bar a federal civil rights challenge to a platform's content removal decision, even where the removal allegedly occurred at the behest of a foreign government and was motivated by discriminatory animus. The case established that § 230's publisher immunity applies to a platform's decision to block or restrict access to third-party content regardless of the reason for that decision — including allegations of politically or discriminatorily motivated moderation. Frequently cited in debates over whether § 230 should be conditioned on neutral content moderation.
View on CourtListener →Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings LLC
Issue: Whether TheDirty.com and its operator Nik Richie materially contributed to the defamatory content of two user-submitted posts about the plaintiff such that § 230(c)(1) immunity did not apply.
Why It Matters: The Sixth Circuit's leading § 230 decision, formally adopting the material contribution standard and clarifying what it requires. A platform must do something specifically to shape or facilitate the unlawful character of the particular content at issue — general encouragement of harmful user submissions is not enough. The case sets a high bar for defeating § 230 under the material contribution theory and remains the definitive Sixth Circuit authority on the scope of platform immunity.
View on CourtListener →Fraley v. Facebook, Inc.
Issue: Whether § 230 immunizes Facebook's "Sponsored Stories" feature, which automatically converted users' "like" activity into paid commercial endorsement advertisements displayed to their friends without consent or compensation.
Why It Matters: An important early decision holding that § 230 does not protect a platform from claims arising from content the platform itself creates by combining user data with advertiser content. The case foreshadowed later disputes about whether algorithmic targeting and data-driven ad products constitute independent platform conduct outside § 230's scope, a line of reasoning developed further in Calise v. Meta.
View on CourtListener →FTC v. Accusearch Inc.
Issue: Whether Accusearch was immune under § 230 for operating a data-broker service that sold confidential telephone records obtained by paid third-party researchers through illegal pretexting.
Why It Matters: Applied the material contribution standard in the Tenth Circuit and confirmed that a data broker loses § 230 immunity when its business model directs third parties to acquire content through inherently illegal means. Contrasts with the Fourth Circuit's Henderson v. Source for Public Data, where a data broker that gathered public records lawfully was granted § 230 protection. Together, Accusearch and Henderson bracket the outer limits of § 230 immunity for the data-broker industry.
View on CourtListener →Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.
Issue: Whether § 230 bars a promissory estoppel claim against Yahoo! arising from a Yahoo! employee's specific oral promise to remove unauthorized, harassing profiles — as distinct from a negligence claim based on Yahoo!'s failure to monitor its platform.
Why It Matters: The foundational Ninth Circuit authority establishing that § 230 does not bar claims arising from a platform's own first-party conduct and representations, as opposed to claims that hold the platform responsible for third-party content. Barnes drew the line between publisher liability (barred) and independent duty arising from a platform's own words and conduct (not barred). The case is the direct ancestor of Estate of Bride v. Yolo Technologies, in which the Ninth Circuit extended this reasoning to promises in terms of service.
View on CourtListener →Doe v. MySpace, Inc.
Issue: Whether § 230 bars negligence and gross negligence claims against MySpace for failing to implement adequate age-verification measures that allegedly would have prevented a minor user from being sexually assaulted by an adult she met on the platform.
Why It Matters: An important early Fifth Circuit application of § 230 to negligence claims arising from online predatory conduct. The court held that § 230 applies regardless of how a plaintiff frames a claim — if the underlying duty would require the platform to monitor, screen, or regulate user content and communications, the claim is barred. Doe v. MySpace reflects the broad pre-Lemmon approach to § 230 that treated platform safety measures as editorial functions immune from liability claims.
View on CourtListener →Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC
Issue: Whether Roommates.com was immune under § 230 for designing a mandatory registration process that required users to disclose and filter by sex, sexual orientation, and familial status — characteristics protected under the Fair Housing Act.
Why It Matters: The leading Ninth Circuit decision defining when a platform becomes a "co-developer" of user content and loses § 230 immunity. Established the "material contribution" test: a platform loses immunity when it materially contributes to the unlawful character of content by structuring how content is created and eliciting the illegal elements. Roommates.com distinguished Carafano's broad immunity rule and articulated the outer boundary of § 230 — a platform that designs its product to generate unlawful content is not a passive host but an active content developer.
View on CourtListener →Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.
Issue: Whether Craigslist could be held liable under the Fair Housing Act's advertising prohibition for providing the online platform on which users posted discriminatory housing notices.
Why It Matters: The Seventh Circuit's definitive § 230 statement on platform liability for user-generated discriminatory housing ads, reaching the opposite outcome from the Ninth Circuit's Roommates.com on closely analogous facts. Easterbrook's opinion reflects a textualist approach: the platform does not "make, print, or publish" discriminatory ads; users do. The case represents a significant counterpoint to the Ninth Circuit's material-contribution standard and illustrates the circuit divide on when platform architecture transforms a neutral host into a content developer.
View on CourtListener →Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.
Issue: Whether Matchmaker.com lost § 230 immunity because it provided a structured multiple-choice questionnaire whose user-supplied answers, combined with user-uploaded photos, constituted a false and harassing profile of a third party.
Why It Matters: Established that a website's use of structured questionnaires and profile templates does not strip it of § 230 immunity unless the platform's structure itself contributes to the harmful or illegal character of the content. The Ninth Circuit's broad reading of § 230 in Carafano was significantly qualified five years later in Roommates.com, which held that a platform loses immunity when its mandatory questionnaire elicits content that is itself unlawful.
View on CourtListener →Blumenthal v. Drudge
Issue: Whether AOL was immune under § 230 for hosting the Drudge Report when AOL paid Drudge $3,000 per month, had exclusive rights to distribute his column, and retained contractual authority to edit or remove content it found objectionable.
Why It Matters: Extended § 230 immunity to platforms that have ongoing commercial relationships with content creators, pay them for content, and retain contractual editing rights — as long as the platform does not actually author the content at issue. Blumenthal established that the immunity analysis turns on actual exercise of editorial control, not the platform's power or contractual right to do so. The opinion's candid acknowledgment that the result may not have been what Congress intended has made it a touchstone in debates over § 230 reform.
View on CourtListener →Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
Issue: Whether § 230(c)(1) bars a distributor liability claim against an online service provider that had notice of defamatory third-party postings and allegedly failed to remove them promptly.
Why It Matters: The landmark foundational decision interpreting § 230. Zeran held that § 230 creates complete immunity from any claim that treats a platform as the publisher or speaker of third-party content — including the distributor liability theory that would arise from notice of defamatory material. The Fourth Circuit's broad reading has been adopted by virtually every circuit court to address the question. Zeran remains the controlling interpretive framework and the starting point for nearly every § 230 analysis in the decades since.
View on CourtListener →Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.
Issue: Whether Prodigy was liable as a publisher of defamatory statements posted by a user, given that Prodigy voluntarily exercised editorial control over content on its boards.
Why It Matters: The direct legislative catalyst for § 230. Congress enacted § 230(c)(1) specifically to reverse the Stratton Oakmont result and eliminate the perverse incentive it created: under Stratton Oakmont, a platform that chose to moderate content assumed publisher liability, while a platform that did nothing was shielded as a mere distributor. § 230 was designed to encourage good Samaritan moderation by immunizing platforms that moderate from publisher liability.
View on CourtListener →Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.
Issue: Whether CompuServe was liable as a publisher or distributor of defamatory statements appearing in a third-party newsletter carried on its online information service.
Why It Matters: The foundational pre-§ 230 defamation case for online services. Cubby established the publisher/distributor distinction in the internet context, holding that a platform which exercises no editorial control is treated as a distributor — not a publisher — and is liable only if it knew or should have known of the defamatory content. This decision gave rise to the "Moderator's Dilemma": when the later Stratton Oakmont decision held that a platform that exercises any editorial control becomes a publisher, platforms faced a perverse incentive to do nothing. Congress enacted § 230 specifically to dissolve that dilemma.
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